The need for reciprocity has led some philosophers to regard romantic love as an impure type of love (Frankfurt 1999:43 Velleman 1999:352.).
Regarding non-instrumental concern, I will assume that loving someone non-instrumentally is compatible with the expectation of reciprocity. My generic definition is not in opposition with either –I say love “involves or consist in” concern. Kolodny 2003) or analogous to what love is, as depicted in the love-as-concern views (cf. I will not be discussing whether concern is a constituent of love, as portrayed in the love-as-valuing views (cf. That concern is (1) non-instrumental and (2) personal.
Loving is a kind of valuing another person that involves or consists in concern for the beloved. Hence, those who state otherwise (within the property view and the relationship view) should face up to this objection coming from the study of break-ups. So, plausibly, they may not independent objects of value in love. That means that, at least in romantic terminations, the beloved and the relationship are not independent objects of grief. I argue that the object that is universally lost in all break-ups is a person with certain intrinsic qualities, who is in a relationship characterised by certain shared activities and recognized as romantic. Is it the beloved, the reciprocation of love, the relationship, or all of it? By answering this question I not only provide with an insight on the nature of break-ups, but also make a specific claim about the nature of love.
I ask which one is the loss that, if it were to be recovered, would stop grief or make it unwarranted. Here, I address that gap by looking at the grieving process which follows unchosen relationship terminations. However, philosophers of love have paid little attention to the phenomenon.
People who experience love often experience break-ups as well.
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